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RECENT CASES
CONDITIONAL SALES-NEGOTIABILITY BY CONTRACT-PUBLIC PoLicy. A sold
B a stoker on a conditional sale contract. The contract provided that, upon
assignment, the assignee would take the contract free of all defenses,
counter-claims, or cross-complaints by B, the buyer. A assigned the con-
tract to C. The stoker didn't work properly. B defaulted on his payments.
When C brought suit to collect, B set up as a defense the breach of A's
warranties. Held: the no-defense clause bars this defense. United States
ex re.. and for the benefit of Administrator of Federal Housing Admin-
istration v. Troy-Parisian, 115 F. (2d) 224 (C.C.A. 9th, 1940).
Normally a conditional sale contract is not negotiable. Motor Contract
Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931). As a non-
negotiable instrument, it is subject to Rs2. Rsv. STAT. § 191, which pro-
vides that all defenses the buyer had against the seller can be set up
against the seller's assignee.
No-defense clauses like that in the present case are an attempt by
vendors and their assignees (who are generally finance companies) to
evade this statute. They hope thereby to impart to their contracts one
of the most important characteristics of negotiability, freedom from de-
fenses possessed by the maker when the instrument passes to a holder
in due course. In Washington the ordinary negotiable note, secured by
the conditional sale contract, is not a desirable device. Our court, recog-
nizing the economic injustice inherent in giving the assignee additional
power over a buyer already carrying over his head the drastic threat
of repossession, has ruled that title to the chattel vests in the buyer when
the seller negotiates the note apart from the conditional sale contract.
This completely destroys the assignee's right of forfeiture. Winton Motor
Carriage Co. v. Broadway Automobile Co., 65 Wash. 650, 118 Pac. 817 (1911).
Because of this, vendors have resorted to devices like that in the instant
case. Since the clause results in the vendee giving up statutory rights,
courts have questioned the validity of the clauses on public policy grounds.
The holdings have not been uniform, but it would seem that generally
such clauses are to be considered invalid where they purport to give up
defenses such as illegality, fraud, usury, or want of consideration. Where
there has been merely a breach of warranty, probably most courts would
consider such clauses valid, though even as to this there is a split of
authority. Clearly no agreement of the parties can make the instrument
completely negotiable. Motor Contract Co. t). Van Der Volgen, supra.
Cases holding no-defense clauses valid are: Howie v. Lewis, 14 Pa. Super.
Ct. 232 (1900) (fraud); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223,
211 Pac. 991 (1922) (breach of warranty); Elzey v. Ajax Heating Co., 10
N. J. Misc. 281, 158 Atl. 851 (1932) (declaratory judgment that clause was
entirely valid); Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108
S. W. (2d) 908 (1937) (breach of warranty); National City Bank v. Prospect
Syndicate, 170 Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 759 (1939).
Cases holding such provisions invalid as contrary to public policy are:
Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, supra (usury); San Francisco
Securities Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 Pac. 229 (1923)
(breach of warranty); American National Bank v. Sommerville, 191 Cal.
364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923) (failure of consideration); Pacific Acceptance
Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 Pac. 444 (1926) (fraud and lack of
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consideration); San Joaquin Finance Corp. v. Allen, 102 Cal. App. 400,
283 Pac. 117 (1929) (usury); Progressive Finance and Realty Co. v. Stempel,
231 Mo. App. 721, 95 S. W. (2d) 834 (1933) (holds no-defense clause
completely invalid); Industrial Loan Co. of Cape Girardeau v. Grisham,
115 S. W. (2d) 214 (1938) (usury, fraud and breach of warranty); Equip-
ment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F. (2d) 442 (C.C.A.
6th, 1941) (fraud but perhaps the assignee took with notice).
Law review articles arguing that parties should be permitted to thus
give their non-negotiable instruments some of the incidents of nego-
tiability are: Buetel, Negotiability by Contract (1933) 28- ILL. L. REv. 205;
Notes, (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 302; (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 272.
Certainly it would seem that public policy should be against the waiver
of such defenses as illegality and fraud, if only for the reason that it
would tend to encourage such practices among vendors. With the defense
of breach of warranty, courts have had more difficulty. Some seem to feel
that there can be no public policy against this. A large part of this
feeling arises from the fact that, under the Uniform Sales Act, parties are
permitted to give up warranties by express agreement. REm. REv. STAT.
§ 5826-71. It can well be argued that the same rule should apply to a
conditional sale contract. However, this fails to take into account the
drastic remedy of forfeiture already possessed by the conditional vendor.
Nor does it consider the fact that to deny the setting up of a defense in
the suit against the assignee forces the vendee to bring a second suit
against the vendor for damages for the breach of warranty, a result highly
undesirable both to the vendee, iri that it puts him to, the uncertainty
and expense of an added law suit, and also to the courts, already clogged
with litigation. Add to this the further fact that in making such a contract
there is a grossly disproportionate advantage in bargaining power on
the part of the vendor in most cases and there are built up strong policy
reasons for denying effect to a no-defense clause in a condtional sale
contract, even when it only involves the denial of the defense of breach
of warranty.
L R.
DIVORCE -MoDxCATION or DECREE. H obtained a divorce from W in
Washington by default, upon service by publication, W at the time resid-
ing in California with two of their three minor children. No provision
was made in the decree for custody and support of any of the children.
Subsequently W returned to Washington with the two children. There-
upon H instituted an action to have himself appointed guardian of these
two children. While this action was pending, W filed a petition in the
original divorce proceeding asking for modification of the divorce decree
to the extent that she be granted exclusive custody of all three children
and that H be required to pay for their support. H applied for a writ
of prohibition to prevent further proceedings by the superior court in
the divorce cause, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Held: Rmv. REv.
STAT. § 988 confers continuing jurisdiction upon the court which grants
a divorce to modify the decree to the extent of providing for custody and
support of minor children, even when no such provision was made in
the original order. State ex rel. Ranken v. Superior Court, 106 Wash.
Dec. 53, 106 P. (2d) 1082 (1940).
Prior to 1933 the court which granted a divorce retained jurisdiction
to modify the decree in two situations: First, where jurisdiction was
1941]
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expressly reserved for that purpose in the decree; and second, if minor
children were provided for in the decree, the court had continuing juris-
diction to modify those provisions at any time during the minority of the
children. Poland v. Poland, 63 Wash. 597, 116 Pac. 2 (1911); Dyer v. Dyer,
65 Wash. 535, 118 Pac. 634 (1911); Delle v. Dalle, 112 Wash. 512, 192 Pac.
966, 193 Pac. 569 (1920). In all other cases the decree was res adjudicata
like any other judgment, and was not subject to modification. Ruge v.
Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1063, L. R. A. 1917F, 721 (1917); Anderson v.
Anderson, 97 Wash. 202, 166 Pac. 60 (1917); Cooper v. Cooper, 146 Wash.
612, 264 Pac. 1 (1928); Rehberger v. Rehberger, 153 Wash. 591, 280 Pac. 8
(1929); Blethen v. Blethen, 177 Wash. 431, 32 P. (2d) 543 (1934); Fisch v.
Marler, 1 Wn. (2d) 698, 97 P. (2d) 147 (1939). The result of this rule was
frequently very harsh, particularly in cases where substantial alimony
had been awarded to the wife and subsequently the husband's financial
condition became such that continued payment of the alimony left him
with little or nothing for himself. The injustice of the rule caused it to
be the subject of considerable criticism, and legislative reform was ad-
vocated. See Chadwick, J., concurring in Ruge v. Ruge, supra. In 1933,
when the rigor of the rule was most strongly felt, the agitation for its
abolition finally bore fruit, in the form of an amendment to REM. REv.
STAT. § 988, Wash. Laws 1933, c. 112, § 1, which provided that the order
"as to alimony and the care, support and education of children may be
modified, altered and revised by the court from time to time as circum-
stances may require." Although, as has been pointed out, the provisions
in a divorce decree for the care, support and education of children were
already subject to modification, it was desirable to restate that rule in
the amendment, so that the new statute would cover all situations in
which the decree could be modified, and preclude the possible argument
that the legislature, having spoken as to one, intended to exclude all others.
In the Ranken case, the court, having conceded that in the absence
of statute the decree there involved was not subject to modification be-
cause it neither expressly reserved jurisdiction nor provided for minor
children, held that the amendment above referred to was an expression
of legislative intent to confer continuing jurisdiction on the court in any
case in which the parties to a divorce had minor children, regardless
of whether or not those children were mentioned or provided for in the
divorce decree. It is difficult to perceive, and the court did not explain,
just where in those words such an intent could be found, particularly
since the intent may be otherwise adequately explained as above. Also,
the court apparently assumes without discussion, that "care, support and
education," as used in the amendment, includes "custody." However,
from a practical standpoint, the adoption of the procedure followed in
the Ranken case may be justifiable, since it is advantageous to the
court, in determining what will, under the circumstances, best serve the
welfare of the children, to have before it the record of the divorce pro-
ceedings, and this procedure eliminates the necessity of preparing and
filing a transcript of that record. The arguments against it are probably
more theoretical than actual. Fourteen states have adopted this procedure
by express statutory enactment. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932)
§ 95.
The real difficulty with the decision in the Ranken case arises from the
fact that the clause in the statute, upon which it is squarely based, per-
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tains to alimony provisions as-well as to provisions for the care, support
and education of children. It seems inescapable that the rule must be
applied to the case where an ex-wife petitions the court for an award
of alimony after a final divorce decree has been granted and a property
settlement made with no provisions for payment of alimony. If the rule
is so applied, the Washington Court will stand virtually alone on this
point. The cases in point are collected in Note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1248,
where the annotator concludes that 'It has been generally, though not
invariably, held that statutes permitting modifications or changes as to
alimony do not apply where no alimony has been granted in the decree."
An examination of the few cases wherein the statutes were held to apply
will reveal that the statutes involved expressly provided that the court
could, in addition to modifying existing orders, make such new orders
as to alimony as the circumstances required, so they are not in point in
Washington. Since no new personal service on ,the ex-husband would
be nebessary to obtain jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against
him by this method, the dangers of permitting it can be readily seen.
The Ranken opinion also contains some interesting implications bearing
upon the Conflicts of Laws problem, discussion of which is outside the
scope of this note.
F. K. F.
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE-LnE STED TESTIMONY. In an
action for wrongful death arising out of a collision between plaintiff's
intestate's car and defendant's truck, physical evidence established that
both the car and the truck were on the wrong sides, respectively, of the
highway when the collision occurred. Defendant, the only surviving wit-
ness to the accident, also testified to that effect. The lower court instructed,
inter alia, that because of the presumption of due care, the law presumed
that the deceased was driving on his own side of the highway, but that
the presumption could be overcome by evidence in the case to the con-
trary. Whether it had been overcome being a question for the jury. The
jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff's exception was taken on
the ground that the instruction failed to tell the jury that contributory
negligence must be established by disinterested witnesses, i. e., that only
the testimony of disinterested witnesses could overcome the presumption.
Held: Affirmed. The instruction ought' not have been given, but the
error was favorable to plaintiff. Dissent: The instruction was properly
given, but was erroneous in that it failed to tell the jury that the pre-
sumption could not be overcome by interested testimony. Erickson v.
Barnes, 106 Wash. Dec. 180, 107 P. (2d) 348 (1940).
The Washington decisions are not harmonious as to the quantum and
quality of evidence required to overcome a presumption. See Falknor,
Notes on Presumptions (1940) 15 WASH. L. Rsv. 71. The court has often
stated that "a presumption is not evidence of anything" and should never
be placed in the scale to be weighed as evidence once it has served its
purpose of requi~ing the opposing party to adduce prima facie evidence.
Scarpelli v. Wash. Water Power Co., 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870 (1911).
Cited with approval in Morris v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 1 Wn.
(2d) 587, 97 P. (2d) 119 (1939). See also 5 WIMORE, EVIDENCE, (2d ed.
1923) § 2491 following THAYER, PRELnV.iNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, (1898),
pp. 339, 346. On the other hand, the court has approved the submission
19411
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of a presumption to the jury where the only opposing evidence is that
of interested witnesses, Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396,
20 P. (2d) 39 (1933), or of disinterested witnesses who might reasonably
be disbelieved. Luna de la Puente v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618,
59 P. (2d) 753 (1936); Karp v. Herder, 181 Wash. 583, 44 P. (2d) 808 (1935).
It will be noted that the presumption is submitted to the jury only
in those cases where the jury might reasonably disbelieve the only
testimony going to rebut it. If such testimony were Idisbelieved, the
presumption controls since it ultimately stands uncontradicted. However,
if the jury does believe the evidence adduced, even though that be the
testimony of interested witnesses alone, the presumption, being thereby
overcome and not partaking of the character of evidence, is of no further
effect at all.
The statement in the dissent that the presumption cannot be overcome
by interested testimony seems questionable in two regards. First, the
distinction between interested and disinterested testimony in opposition
to a presumption has heretofore been deemed of significance only in
determining whether the presumption should be submitted to the jury
at all, i. e., whether it has been overcome as a matter of law. Second,
the suggestion in the dissent would make the presumption conclusive
where the only evidence opposing it consists of the testimony of inter-
ested witnesses. In such circumstances, it would be idle to even put on
interested testimony. Telling the jury that certain testimony can be
given no weight (and this would be the effect where the testimony
could not overcome the presumption) might well be unconstitutional
as denying the right to trial by jury, since the determination of whether
the testimony of an interested witness is credible or not is taken from
the jury. It would at least amount to a comment by the judge on the
testimony.
H. J. D.
HOMICDE-PasSUMmON OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. In a criminal prose-
cution for the homicide of the accused's mother, the trial court refused
to instruct the jury, upon the defendant's request, that if the killing were
admitted, it would be presumed that the crime, if any crime had been
committed by the defendant, was that of murder in the second degree.
Held: The defendant could not claim error in the failure to give the in-
struction. Mr. Justice Blake dissented, holding that the instruction should
have been given. State v. Davis, 106 Wash. Dec. 567, 108 P. (2d) 641 (1940).
A careful search has failed to disclose a prior case, either in Washington
or elsewhere, where this precise question has been determined. In all of
the cases relied upon by the defendant, the defendants, having pleaded
not guilty, objected to the giving of the instruction, contending that it
placed upon them an undue burden. In this case, the defendant pleaded
guilty to the charge of murder in the first degree, and claimed error in the
failure to give the instruction.
The court concluded that as the jury was otherwise properly and
completely instructed, no right of the defendant was violated by the
failure to instruct on the presumption, holding that the presumption was
to aid the prosecution. It was a rule originally adopted out of neces-
sity to assist the state in establishing a connected and complete prima
facie case. Unlike the statutory presumption of innocence this presumption
is not one established for the benefit and protection of a person charged
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with the commission of a crime. In the early case of State v. Payne, 10
Wash. 545, 39 Pac. 157 (1895) . the court made a careful study of the
history of and reasons for the doctrine that the jury should be instructed
that a homicide having been proved it should be presumed that it was
murder in the second degree. The same rule was approved in the
case of State v. White, 10 Wash. 611, 39 Pac. 160, 41 Pac. 442 (1895); State
v. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 Pac. 489 (1903); State v. Clark, 58 Wash. 128,
107 Pac. 1047 (1910); State v. Duincan, 101 Wash. 542, 172 Pac. 915 (1918);
and State v. Gallagher, 4 Wn. (2d) 437, 103 P. (2d) 1100 (1940).
In Washington, the burden of persuasion is put upon the state to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed, with design, and
maliciously, that is, not excusably or justifiably. Thus it can be seen
that there is room for a true presumption. Once the homicide has been
proved or is admitted, the presumption is that it was murder in the
second degree. If the basic fact-the homicide-is shown, the presumed
fact-murder in the second degree-must be taken as true, unless there
is something in the case to rebut it. By this presumption, the burden of
going forward with the evidence shifts to the defendant, although the
ultlimate burden of persuasion remains upon the state.
One can readily perceive that such a presumption is necessary to ef-
fectively administer justice. In the leading case of State v. Payne, supra,
Mr. Justice Hoyt, in a well-reasoned opinion, recognized that, "If it is
held that the fact of killing does not raise the presumption that it was
malicious, the administration of criminal justice will be greatly interfered
with." He continues with the classical example that without such presump-
tion to aid the prosecution it might happen that two persons would be
alone in a room, and one kill the other, without any justification whatever,
and yet the prosecution be utterly unable to secure his conviction, for
the reason that there was nothing to show the circunstances'surrounding
the killing.
Thus, as the presumption is to relieve the prosecution of its initial
burden of going forward after the homicide is proved, and the state is
entitled to an instruction upon the presumption, there is no right of an
accused violated if the instruction on such presumption is not given, as
it is not the accused's right to request such an instruction.
The brief statements of-the law enunciated in the dissent, to the effect
that a homicide having been admitted or iproven beyond a reasonable
doubt the presumption is that it is murder in the second degree; that the
presumption will prevail if-there is nothing in the case to rebut it; that
if the defendant would reduce the crime to manslaughter, the burden
is on him to rebut the presumption; and that if the state would elevate
the crime to murder in the first degree, the burden is upon it to establish
the essential characteristics of that crime, and that the jury should
be so instructed, are well supported by the authorities, but do not appear
relevant to the issue of whether the accused is entitled to the instruction.
J. G.
LABOR LAW-LABOR DISPUTE-SECONDARY BOYCOTT. Plaintiff, the employer,
and defendant union entered into an agreement which provided, among
other things, that: "There shall be no goods delivered to or sold at the
plant for resale from trucks to persons not in good standing with Local
Union No. 524." Although there was no dispute between P and his em-
ployees, defendant called a strike and put a picket in front of P's store
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because P's main customer employed non-union truck drivers. P sought
an injunction. Held: injunction denied. Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters'
Union Local No. 524, 105 Wash. Dec. 297, 105 P. (2d) 46 (1940). The court
held that the above-mentioned provision converted the disagreement
into a lawful labor dispute (see REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939), § 7612-13
which the court cites) and that there was no secondary boycott since none
of P's customers had been intimidated not to buy.
In previous Washington cases where injunctions have been sought, the
problem has been largely one of determining whether a "labor dispute"
existed. Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d)
372 (1935), Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Union, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422
(1939). In the instant case, the court adopted the same approach in
reaching its decision, holding that since there had been a contract made
between the union and P, and since that contract had been breached, a
labor dispute existed.
The court stated at the inception that under these facts, a labor dispute
would have existed according to the following cases: Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468. 81 L. ed. 1229 (1937); Lauf v. Shinner & Co.,
303 U. S. 323, 82 L. ed. 872 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Gro-
cery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 82 L. ed. 1012 (1938). But it is suggested that this
case differs from these and other previous cases in that here the real
dispute did not exist between P and the union. The court viewed the
case wholly in the light of a two-party relationship, and thus no con-
sideration was given to the validity of the mentioned provision as in
effect legalizing a secondary boycott.
Considering P as the court did, as the primary disputant, it is clear
that the mere picketing of his establishment did not coerce any third
persons from withholding their business relations with him. A real prob-
lem of secondary boycott arises, however, not when we consider P as the
primary employer with whom the union has the dispute, but as the
third party who is being coerced in the dispute between the union and P's
main customer. Does not such coercion clearly fall within the generally
accepted view of a secondary boycott? Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 65 L. ed. 349 (1920); United Union Brewing Co. v.
Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939).
It should be noted that the relationship between the union and the
P is different than the usual secondary boycott case, since here it is the
retailer, rather than the manufacturer, that has the dispute with the
union and thus no "non-union product" enters the picture. The ordinary
practice of declaring the retailer who purchases the non-union product
as unfair is universally condemned, although it must be mentioned
that recent decisions from New York have permitted picketing if the
banners are considered to be directed against the product rather than
the retailer himself. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 267 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d)
910, 116 A. L. R. 477 (1937). But this reasoning is not applicable to
those cases where the union has picketed the supplier of the employer
with whom they have the dispute, and such practice has been declared
illegal, even in liberal New York. Wohl et al. v. Bakery & Pastry Drivers'
Local, etc., 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1939) (injunction granted against picketing
a manufacturer of baking goods because two peddlers would not employ
union men to distribute goods); Feldman v. Weiner, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 730
(1940) (picketing a wholesaler who had no quarrel with the union to
[VOL. 6
RECENT CASES
coerce another company to whom P sold products, declared a secondary
boycott). See also Vonnegut Mach. Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co., 263
Fed. 192 (Dist. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1920). (It might be noted that N. Y. has a
statute similar to our own.)
The instant case is distinguishable from these only because of the pro-"
vision in the contract between the supplier and the union. Is this, then,
a new device to legalize what would otherwise be a secondary boycott?
Should not such a provision as this, which forces one man to pay the cost
of another's failure to concede to the union's demands be carefully scru-
tinized before being given legal sanction? See Barnard and Graham,
Labor and the Secondary Boycott (1940), 15 WAsV. L. Rv. 137, 153.
It should be mentioned that the recent case of A. F. of L. v. Swing, 61
S. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. 513 (1941) where an injunction was denied even
though there was no dispute between the employees and the employer
does not bolster this case, since there a real dispute as to unionization
existed between the picketing union and the employer.
It may be that the stage has been reached where the validity of union
agreements has been so firmly established that the court feels it unneces-
sary to inquire past the fact of the forming of a contract, even though
such contract permits conditions outside the control of the employer to
create a "labor dispute" between himself and the union. Whatever the
a~titude of the court, it might well have taken a more definite stand on
the important question of secondary boycott involved herein, instead of
being content to confine its inquiry to a search for a "labor dispute"
and, having found a violation of a union contract, hold against the
employer.
H. E. K.
TENAxcY in Coamo--CoNT=u xoN FOR TAXES-STATuORY CoNsTRUCTIoN.
Plaintiffs and defendants were tenants in common of land, their interests
being one-third and two-thirds respectively. Plaintiffs, paid the entire
tax levied without seeking a segregation as permitted.under RM. REV.
STAT. § 11264, and now seek to recover two-thirds of the amount so
paid and to have a lien therefor upon the defendants' interest in the land.
The trial court denied relief upon the theory that, the statute permitting
segregation of the tax upon cotenant's interests, the payment of the whole
tax was unnecessary to protect plaintiffs and, thus, voluntary. Held:
That the statute does not provide an exclusive method of procedure
and that plaintiffs are entitled to the lien requested. Olson v. Chatan,
4 Wn. (2d) 522, 104 P. (2d) 344 (1940).
The general rule is that the tenant in common who-has paid the entire
amount of taxes has a right to contribution from his cotenant, propor-
tionate to the latter's interest, and acquires a lien upon this interest to
enforce contribution. 2 TnFANY, REAL PEOpRTY (3d ed. 1939) § 460; Note
(1927) 48 A. L. R. 586. However, those states granting such recovery
either have no statute expressly permitting segregation or else there exists
a statute expressly granting the cotenant a lien if he pays all of the taxes.
The reason generally stated for allowing the recovery Is that since one
tenant must pay an obligation levied against the common property to
protect himself from loss of his own interest, he should be entitled to a
refund from the other. Tested by this, the tenant in common in Wash-
ington does not seem compelled to make payment of taxes on his co-
tenant's share, and should be denied recovery. Preston v. Wright, 81 Me.
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306, 17 Atl. 128, 10 Am. St. Rep. 257 (1889), and In re Lohr's Estate, 132
Pa. Super. Ct. 125, 200 Atl. 135 (1938), in so holding, denied the paying
tenant any recovery. And see Wilson v. Sanger, 57 App. Div. 323, 68 N. Y.
S. 124 (1900), and the dissent in the Olson case. This argument is stressed
in a note upon this same case. (1941) 54 HARV. L. REV. 499.
The result reached here is desirable, however, in that it may be sus-
tained upon other grounds. It encourages the prompt payment of taxes,
which is clearly in accordance with the policy of the state. Manifest
injustice results where one tenant may have charges levied against his
own interest paid by his cotenant, and retain full right to his interest
with no expense or liability to himself. A tenant may pay in order that
the undivided share of the other should not be sold for taxes, so that
the land will be kept intact, or will not fall into the hands of strangers.
Although he will fail in this purpose if the other never makes an effort
to pay and the interest must be sold for taxes or foreclosure on a lien,
if he had reasonably hoped the other would later contribute his share,
he should have a claim on the other's interest for these taxes. If the
other intended to let the property go for taxes, and then desires to
reclaim it from the tenant who paid, clearly he should be forced to com-
pensate the other first. Likewise, under many circumstances it seems
desirable to allow one tenant in common the right to acquire title to the
entire interest. He cannot do this by letting the land go for taxes and
buying in at the tax sale. Stone v. Marshall, 52 Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858
(1909); Dwight v. Waldron, 96 Wash. 156, 164 Pac. 761 (1917); Buchanan v.
First National Bank, 184 Wash. 185, 50 P. (2d) 520 (1935). While he may
do so by having a separate assessment made and buying in when the
other's interest is sold for nonpayment, 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd
ed. 1939) § 465, Note (1928) 54 A. L. R. 874 at 906, this places the extra
burden upon him of securing the separate assessment, and he has no
hope of accomplishing those purposes set forth above. But under the
lien granted in the Olson case he may acquire the full interest in the
property upon foreclosure of his lien. 2 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (2d
ed. 1940) § 1853, Note (1928) 54 A. L. R. 874, 906.
S. K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PRE-EXISTING DISEASE. A logger, suffering
from a pre-existing heart disease, induced by chronic alcoholism, was
sawing down a tree, making no extraordinary effort, when he fell dead
from heart failure. His widow was granted compensation upon a showing
that he might have continued to live if he had not been engaged in this
heavy work. Held: That where one engaged in a hazardous industry dies
upon the job, compensation will be allowed if the causal relationship
between the labor and the death can be demonstrated. McCormick Lum-
ber Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 106 Wash. Dec. 629, 108 P. (2d)
807 (1941).
This case raises the problem of the definition of the term "injury."
Our legislature has been more specific in defining this term than legis-
latures of other states. See ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928), §§ 7554 and
7596; N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law, § 2(7). Under the first Wash-
ington Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911, "injury" was defined as:
"The words injury or injured as used in this act, refer only to an injury
resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction
of disease." WASH. LAws 1911, c. 74 § 3. From the first the court allowed
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recovery where a pre-existing disease, coupled with an unusual exertion
in the course of employment, resulted in disability or death. For, said
the court, the statute did not limit its benefits only to those in perfect
health. Zappala v. Ind. Ins. Comm., 82 Wash. 314, 144 Pac. 54 (1914);
Shadbolt v. Dept. of Labor-& Industries, 121 Wash. 409, 209 Pac. 683 (1922);
Frandila v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 137 Wash. 530, 243 Pac. 5 (1926);
Cole v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 137 Wash. 538, 243 Pac. 7, (1926).
Apparently with the intent of defeating recovery in just this situation,
the legislature'in 1929 amended the statute to read as follows: "The word
'injury' as used in this act means a sudden and tangible happening, of
a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occur-
ring from without, and such physical condition as results therefrom."
REM. Rnv. STAT. § 7675. But the court continued the rule that recovery
would be allowed where the disability or death was the result of the
combination of extraordinary exertion and an existing disease, and con-
tinued to cite cases decided before the amendment as authority. Smith
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 501,38 P. (2d) 212 (1934); McGuire
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 645, 38 P. (2d) 266 (1934);
Daugherty tj. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 626, 63 P. (2d) 434
(1936); Devlin v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P. (2d)
952 (1938); cf. Flynn v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 346, 62 P.
(2d) 728 (1936). See also, Note (1939) 14 WAsH. L. REv. 329.
In the instant case, however, the court has extended the doctrine. The
requirement of extraordinary exertion has been abrogated because the
court felt that to fix a standard, as to what is unusual exertion, would
be impossible. Instead the court advances the test: "An accident arises
out of the employment when the required exertion producing the acci-
dent is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree
of exertion or the condition of the workma7's health." This is a liberal
interpretation of the statute. In effect, as Justice Simpson pointed out in
the dissent, it makes the Workmen's Compensation Act a form of indus-
trial insurance. It may be that this is advisable, but surely it.is wthin
the province of the legislature to so determine.
In Alabama, the legislature has tried to solve the same problem by
defining the effect upon recovery where the pre-existing disease is a con-
tributing cause, but the Supreme Court in that state held it applicable
only in cases of disability, not where the workman died. ALA. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1928) § 7561; U. S. Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Hartley, 217 Ala. 462,
116 So. 666 (1928). It seems that the general trend of authority is in accord
with the Washington holding, in that courts -generally construe such
statutes liberally. Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 1316; cf. Cal. Notion & Toy Co.
v. Ind. Acc. Com. 59 Cal. App. 225, 210 Pac. 524 (1922); Barnabas v. Ber-
sham Colliery Co., 103 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 513, 55 Sol. Jo. 63, 4 B. W. C. C
119 (1910).
Since the employer pays into the fund at a rate determined by his
"cost experience" (REm. REV. STAT. § 7676) it beho6ves him to select only
healthy young men as employees. This may have definite disadvantages
to the welfare of the state. If the doctrine of this case is to be continued,
it might be well if a new means of measuring "cost experience" be
devised, whereby -such deaths would not count against the employer.
Such a bill (Senate Bill No. 207) was introduced in the 1941 legislative
session but was not voted upon. . F. P.
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